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CHAIN MIGRATION OVER LEGALLY CLOSED BORDERS: SETTLED IMMIGRANTS AS BRIDGEHEADS AND GATEKEEPERS

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Introduction

Developments in Turkish migration to the Netherlands have repeatedly surprised migration scholars and Dutch authorities alike. Three decades ago, when the Netherlands started to recruit Turkish workers, they were seen as international commuters rather than permanent settlers. Although the turn-over rates of Turkish workers were quite high in the first years, by 1975 they had fallen considerably. A concomitant development, likewise unforeseen, was that ever-increasing numbers of Turkish workers had their families come to the Netherlands. By 1985 the vast majority of the labour migrants had been reunited with their wives and children. Therefore it came as a surprise when the number of immigrants from Turkey started to rise again in the second half of the 1980s. Most of the newcomers arrived as the spouses of labour migrants' children.

Neither authorities nor migration scholars had anticipated that Turkish migration chains would be maintained for over a decade after the recruitment of Turkish workers had come to an end. But then, migration chains of any importance are certainly not a universal phenomenon among migrant groups. The mechanism of chain migration, with earlier migrants helping or encouraging others in their community of origin to follow suit¹, requires that settled migrants remain linked with relatives or friends in their communities of origin who also want to emigrate. This article analyses the role of kinship networks in the migration of Turks to the Netherlands. It focusses on the adaptations of Turkish immigrants and prospective migrants to the Dutch admittance policy, which has gradually become more restrictive since the end of the 1960s. The first part of the article examines the literature on chain migration. The second part presents some of the findings of a small-scale study on Turkish migrants in the Netherlands and their relatives in Turkey.²

Research on chain migration from Turkey to Western Europe

Few if any studies systematically address the adaptations of Turkish immi-

grants and prospective migrants to the restrictive admittance policies of Western European governments (cf. Muus and Penninx 1991, 77-86). Studies on the labour migration in the 1960s and early 1970s – the recruitment period – demonstrate, however, that many Turkish migrant workers arrived in Western Europe with the help of earlier migrants. The Turkish Employment Service (TES) maintained lists of candidates for employment abroad. Foreign employers could simply request a number of workers from these lists (anonymous recruitment), but they could also name or ‘nominate’ a particular Turkish worker to fill a vacancy (nominative recruitment). As the registry lists lengthened, many Turks wanting to emigrate had a relative or friend who was already abroad locate a vacancy and persuade the employer to nominate their kinsman or friend in Turkey to fill it. Many others entered Western Europe as ‘tourists’³ (without a recruitment contract), relying on relatives or fellow villagers already there to secure them a job and the required permits (Abadan-Unat 1976; Kudat 1974; Martin 1991; Penninx and Van Velzen 1976; Yücel 1987).

From studies on this period, it is also known that many Turks wishing to go abroad tried to increase their chances by taking advantage of the Turkish government’s policy of giving emigration priority to people from certain areas (the less developed regions and disaster areas). A study in the Turkish district of Bogazliyan noted that candidates for anonymous recruitment often attempted to get residence certificates in priority areas, to get preferential treatment (Penninx and Van Velzen 1976, 179 ff.). The admittance policies of receiving countries also played a role. According to Özel and Nauck (1987, 65-66), at the end of the 1960s about a million Turkish men had their wives or daughters registered as candidates for employment abroad as well as themselves. Turkish labour migration was predominantly a male affair, but at the time female workers were in great demand, particularly in the German electrotechnical industry. The men hoped that if they were not recruited themselves, their wives or daughters would be, and they would be eligible for a family reunification permit.

Studies on the period after the recruitment halts in Western Europe (1973-74) are rather scarce, but it is clear that restrictive admittance policies have not put an end to chain migration. Engelbrektsson observed that in the second half of the 1970s, Turkish immigrants and prospective migrants made highly effective use of the Swedish regulations on family reunification. In Engelbrektsson’s research group, several marriages were arranged with Swedish women, dates of birth were changed and adoption documents were produced from Turkey to obtain residence permits (Engelbrektsson 1978, 68-74, 206-212).

In the 1980s there was a shift from first-generation labour migrants reuniting with their families to their children forming new families. Studies

in Germany have shown that many first-generation migrants marry off their children to relatives or acquaintances in their country of origin. Gitmez and Wilpert (1987, 95) noted that many young men in Turkey are willing to pay high bride-prices for migrants' daughters, since marrying into a Turkish family in Germany offers them prospects of a residence permit and access to the German labour market (cf. Geiersbach 1990, 136-137; Wilpert 1992).

Gitmez and Wilpert also observed that Turkish villagers were much more likely to participate in chain migration than urban Turks. Before the recruitment halt, villagers made more use of nominative recruitment and 'tourist' migration to find their way to Germany. After the recruitment halt they resorted more than urban migrants to the provisions for family reunification in the German admittance policy. Gitmez and Wilpert suggested that rural migrants uphold the custom of arranging their children's marriages with cousins from their village of origin (1987, 92-95).

Studies on other migration flows

In studies on other migration flows, particularly to classical immigration countries like the United States, the interplay between chain migration and admittance policies has been examined more systematically. Two older, but still often cited studies are those by MacDonald and MacDonald on Italian migration to the United States and Australia from the end of the nineteenth century onward (1964, 1970). Both countries preferred northern to southern European immigrants. The Australian authorities tried to control the migration by requiring personal nominations and maintenance guarantees. This policy was aimed at discouraging the immigration of southern Europeans while encouraging northerners, but it served to produce a favourable context for southern Italian chain migration. According to MacDonald and MacDonald, this came about because the policy-makers did not realize that the migration movements had a structure of their own: 'the authorities made chain migration official without being aware of it' (1970, 254). The mechanism of chain migration was much stronger in southern Italy than in the north. To account for this difference, MacDonald and MacDonald noted the binding force of kinship and patronage relations, which was greatest in the south of Italy (1970, 269; cf. MacDonald and MacDonald 1964).

In the 1970s, more and more researchers focussed their attention on the role of networks in international migration processes. By the late 1980s, a growing number of mainly United States studies had been conducted on the role of networks in the settlement and integration of immigrant populations. Considerable attention was also devoted to the interplay between admittance policies and chain migration (Boyd 1989; Portes and Böröcz 1989).

For instance, DeJong, Root and Abad (1986) conducted a survey in the

Philippines, to examine the changing pattern of Philippine migration to the United States after 1970. The number of Filipinos admitted to the United States on the basis of family ties with migrants already there exhibited a marked increase, whereas the number of admittances on the basis of occupational qualifications decreased. The research findings indicated that the decision-making process of potential migrants was informed and guided by the family reunification provisions in the United States immigration policy. Half the intended migrants with close family ties in the United States were able to actualize their intentions in the two-year study period.

Garrison and Weiss (1979) analysed the migration process of one Dominican family, the underlying question being how extended families adapt to the United States immigration regulations, which tend to limit the right of family reunification to the nuclear family with the mother and the father legally married. One of their findings was that the United States immigration regulations did not prevent the entry of family members. Regulations merely caused delays in the movement of some members, and illegal movement of others. The Dominican family utilized illegal as well as legal mechanisms to reunite in the United States. For instance, one legally married couple divorced, and another consensually married couple refrained from legal marriage in order to accommodate marriages *de favor* or *por interés* (i.e. legal marriages with citizens or permanent residents of the United States to obtain residence rights). In the short run, these adaptations yielded the desired results. Over a ten to fifteen year period, however, Garrison and Weiss noted disruptive influences neither intended nor desired by either the migrants or the receiving country's authorities.

Expectations

Combined with more general insights from studies in the field of the sociology of law, the above literature leads to the following expectations regarding the interplay between immigration policy and chain migration. This interplay occurs because admittance policies do not prevent all immigration and because immigrants and prospective migrants take advantage of the possibilities left open by the authorities. Unlike the immigration policy of the United States, which includes a quota system, Western European immigration policies predominantly resort to regulations. In the Netherlands, a complex and detailed body of rules has been formulated regarding the admittance of foreign workers, Surinamese nationals, nationals of EC member states, and family members of foreigners already residing in the Netherlands. Policies that resort to regulations will never be fully effective. Effectiveness is apt to be influenced by various factors.

First, the policy goals are of importance. The chances of a policy attaining

its aims will be greater if its goals are clear and unambiguous. As to the admittance policies of most immigration countries, it can be ascertained that preventing immigration is not the only policy goal. The rules leave a certain extent of leeway for certain forms of immigration, for instance on humanitarian grounds. The permissible immigration includes certain forms of chain migration. Like such classical immigration countries as the United States, European states have made provisions for family reunification. Policies in other areas may also influence the effectiveness of immigration restrictions. For example, Germany stopped issuing work permits to newly arrived family members of migrant workers in 1974 so as to discourage them from coming, but it also introduced a lower child allowance for the workers' children living abroad, thus encouraging Turkish workers to bring their children to Germany (Martin 1991, 31).

The effectiveness of policies resorting to regulation also depends on the degree to which the policy goals are endorsed by the people the regulations are aimed at. There will be a greater chance of their observing the rules if they regard them as being in their own interest. As for admittance policies, however, no matter how emphatically the authorities of the receiving country insist that immigration restrictions are for the good of settled immigrants, intending migrants as well as settled immigrants wishing to be joined by their relatives or friends can be assumed to look upon restrictive regulations as being contrary to their interests.

Finally, the enforcement of regulations constitutes an important factor. Effectiveness will be greater if infringers run a higher risk of being discovered and punished. As regards admittance policies, in most countries it is only possible to a limited extent to enforce regulations by means of border controls or internal police surveillance. Besides, one might wonder whether illegal immigrants have a lot to lose by it. If they are discovered, they may be expelled, but certainly not all prospective migrants will be deterred by this sanction in itself.

The above literature makes it clear that new migrants are apt to utilize their kinship networks in such a way as to make the most of existing regulations. Provisions for family reunification and admittance on the basis of kinship ties can thus result in massive chain migration. It is also clear, however, that some migrant groups are more inclined than others to utilize kinship ties in this way. Admittance policies often limit reunification rights to the nuclear or conjugal family (spouse and underage children of a settled immigrant), imposing restrictions on the immigration of other relatives. For some migrant groups, however, the extended family is the natural residential or subsistence unit; for them the conjugal family is not the natural and distinct unit it is presumed to be in immigration policies. The literature demonstrates that the groups in question have more trouble with the restrictions on immigration,

but greater opportunities to circumvent them. The groups concerned take as much advantage of legal mechanisms as possible, but also utilize whatever illegal mechanisms they can to have their relatives join them (cf. Boyd 1989, 648-649).

This may be the case with Turkish migrants too, especially from rural origins. In a survey held in Turkey in 1968, almost 40 per cent of all the households in rural areas were found to contain more than a nuclear family. This was only true of 20 per cent in the larger cities. Although in practice a large variety of household forms were found, the patrilineal extended family (consisting of a husband and wife, their unmarried children and their married sons with their wives and children) was considered the ideal household form by a majority of the respondents. Patrilineal extended families accounted for 25 per cent of all the rural households.⁴ The survey also found that parents arranged a large majority of the marriages, especially in rural areas. This practice resulted in a high proportion (36 per cent) of marriages between relatives (Timur 1978). Other studies noted that the patrilineal extended family was also the major 'buffer institution' for individuals living in nuclear family households. The members of the extended family continued to have the obligation to support each other (see, for example, Kiray 1974).

Turkish migrants in the Netherlands: past and present chain migration

The following sections are based on in-depth interviews and observation of a small sample of Turkish households in Nijmegen, a medium-sized town in the Netherlands, supplemented by interviews with relatives of some of the migrants in Turkey. The field work took place in 1988-1989. The research population consisted of 28 households with 80 adult members. These respondents came from various parts of Turkey. Half of them emigrated directly from Turkish villages to Western Europe. The other half had lived in a Turkish town or city prior to their emigration, but only some of them were actually born there. Thus a large majority of the research population had village origins. More than half the households were headed by labour migrants who arrived in the Netherlands before the recruitment halt. The remaining households were established by the children of migrants, who were admitted to the Netherlands for family reunification. Nearly all these children had lived in Turkey until they were ten or older. They all had their marriage partners come over from Turkey.

Chain migration in the past

More than half the first-generation men in the research population did not come to the Netherlands by way of official recruitment, but through media-

tion by earlier arrivals. Many of them initially lived in with their relatives or friends. This must have been a common phenomenon in the first years of Turkish migration. A survey conducted in Berlin in 1974 revealed that many Turkish households had lodgers who had come over to try their luck on the German labour market. The surprising thing was that not only the husband's relatives were lodged, as is common in rural areas in Turkey, but also the wife's, and even non-relatives. The researchers suggested that an 'extension of traditional solidarities' had occurred among the migrants (Kudat 1974, 10-11). My respondents did not share this view. Men who arrived ten to twenty years ago as 'tourists' remarked that they had easily found work at the time, so that they were no financial burden to their hosts. Settled immigrants who provided distant relatives and non-relatives with lodgings were often motivated by self-interest rather than solidarity. According to some respondents, 'tourists' even ran the risk of being betrayed by their helpers:

'It happened that a compatriot secured you a job and offered to keep your earnings for you. You could not keep the money yourself, you knew you would lose it if they caught you. There was a chance, however, that the same compatriot would give you up to the police after say a year, when you had saved a substantial sum. You could get rounded up and deported without ever knowing who it was who betrayed you.'

This man had lodged with a cousin by marriage himself. He claimed to have given this relative more than 10,000 guilders, partly as a reimbursement, partly as a loan. Afterwards the relative refused to repay the loan, claiming that the total amount should be considered board and lodging.⁵

Chain migration at present

Economic conditions have changed over the past twenty years. Unemployment has increased dramatically among settled immigrants. Newcomers, whether legal or illegal, are not able to find work as easily as in the past. The changed economic context imposes certain restrictions on the mechanism of chain migration. What's more, the Dutch immigration policy has become more restrictive. Official recruitment has virtually come to an end. Non-EC workers are only admitted for the specific positions there is an inadequate domestic supply of labour for, for example imams, teachers and managers or executives at Turkish firms with branches in the Netherlands. It is no longer possible for 'tourists' to secure a job and subsequently have their status legalized. Since the introduction of the visa requirement for Turks in 1980, for that matter, it is no longer easy to enter the Netherlands as a 'tourist'.

For the large majority of prospective Turkish migrants, the present Dutch

immigration policy means the following are the only ways to enter the country: as a family member of a migrant settled in the Netherlands, as an asylum-seeker, or on a visa for a short stay. Only the first way (family reunification) offers access to the Dutch labour market and, as a rule, prospects of a permanent residence permit. The second way, applying for asylum, does not fully exclude this possibility, but the chance of an asylum request being granted is very small. The third way, a visa for tourism or a family visit, only offers the possibility of a three-month stay. In addition to these legal ways, there is of course the option of illegal entry. An asylum-seeker who has been rejected or a 'tourist' whose visa has expired can also prolong his or her stay in the Netherlands without authorization.

Between 1985 and 1992, an average of 10,000 Turks immigrated annually to the Netherlands. The large majority were joining their parents or spouses already in the Netherlands. The number of Turkish asylum-seekers fluctuated between 400 and 1,400 a year. The number of Turks admitted as labourers amounted to no more than a few dozen annually, and the number of Turks admitted as students was in the same order of magnitude. The number of illegal Turkish immigrants is not known, of course, and estimates vary widely. At the beginning of 1993 the total number of Turks residing in the Netherlands amounted to over 220,000.

The case descriptions below give an impression of how legal, semi-legal and illegal chain migration options were used in the research population.

The case of Hikmet⁶ and his younger brothers

In 1979 Hikmet joined his father's brother in the Netherlands as a 'tourist'. He was 21 years of age and unmarried. His uncle got him an irregular job here. After a year Hikmet had saved some 5,000 guilders and no longer wanted to return to Turkey. His uncle was willing to help him find a bride in the Netherlands. Hikmet himself already had a girl in mind. Her family came from a village near his native village. They asked her parents for her hand. Her parents were not unwilling to give their daughter in marriage to Hikmet, but requested 20,000 guilders as a bride-price. A lower amount was out of the question. Hikmet suggested to his uncle that they abduct the girl. He had a feeling she herself was willing to marry him. The abduction would leave the girl and her parents no other choice: no decent man would want to marry her because everyone would assume she was no longer a virgin.

The abduction was carried out with the result desired by Hikmet. The girl agreed to marry him. A few months later they became reconciled with her family, and Hikmet paid them a large part of the desired bride-price. After his marriage and the legalisation of his stay in the Netherlands, he did fine. He and his wife both worked. He managed to have a new house built in Turkey

for his family. A year or two later, Hikmet's family appealed to him. His younger brother Erol expressed a wish to join him in the Netherlands. He did not want to continue living with his parents at the farm, and preferred to join his brother in the Netherlands. His parents also thought the farm was too small. As Erol had reached the marriageable age, they asked Hikmet to arrange his marriage in the Netherlands.

Hikmet feared it would not be easy to find a girl who was entitled to have her spouse come over. The family reunification provisions in the Dutch admittance policy had recently been changed. Besides a permanent residence permit, second-generation migrants wanting to bring in their spouse now had to have an income amounting to the official minimum wage. In the past, only migrants without a permanent resident permit had had to meet an income requirement. Hikmet and his wife soon found a bride for Erol, though. Her family came from the same village as Hikmet's wife. The girl did not really earn enough, but her employer was prepared to put her on the payroll for a higher amount. In the end this was not necessary, because the income requirement was rescinded before the wedding. However, Hikmet had already agreed to pay the girl's parents a high bride-price. Hikmet and his father jointly bore the costs of the marriage.

After his marriage, Erol settled in the Netherlands. A few years later another brother, Yeter, indicated a desire to emigrate. Hikmet tried to talk him out of it. In the meantime, he and his wife had both lost their jobs. Hikmet's wife was particularly against the idea of yet another brother-in-law coming to the Netherlands. She thought they had paid enough already to have Erol get married and come over. Erol, in turn, felt more obliged to help Yeter. He had Yeter come over on a family visit visa. Subsequently, the search for a bride began again. Hikmet and Erol took charge of this matter together.

The case of the Güzel family

Mr Güzel came to the Netherlands in 1975, after the recruitment of Turkish workers had already been discontinued. He was 30 years old, married and a father. A fellow villager (who was also a distant relative of his) was working here already. He helped Mr Güzel make use of a regulation valid at the time for legalizing illegal foreign workers. He found an employer willing to state (for a fee) that Mr Güzel had been working for him for a year.

In 1985 Mr Güzel brought his family over. Actually, the eldest son did not qualify for admittance as a family member, because he was already married (to a daughter of his father's sister). However, he and his wife had had a religious wedding without a prior civil ceremony, so he could enter the Netherlands as an unmarried son of his father. After his wedding, he and his wife had continued to live at his father's home. This was why Mr Güzel did

not even consider leaving his son behind in Turkey. His daughter-in-law, however, did have to stay behind for the time being. She moved in with her parents. The Güzel family's second child, a daughter, was engaged. In consultation with her fiancé and his parents, distant relatives of Mrs Güzel, it was decided to postpone the wedding, for the fiancé was also interested in emigrating to the Netherlands.

Two years later, the Güzel family went to Turkey for a family visit. The eldest son and his wife finally had their marriage registered. Having a job and sufficient income in the Netherlands, he fulfilled the requirements for family reunification. The eldest daughter also got married, but since she did not have a job here, she could not bring her husband with her to the Netherlands. During their stay in Turkey, the Güzel family received two marriage proposals for their second daughter, both from next of kin. Mrs Güzel had had a great deal of support from a brother of hers in the years before the family reunification. When she left for the Netherlands, she said goodbye to him with a promise: 'I will do what I can to release your son from this poverty. I will get him to Holland.' Now her brother expected her to give her daughter in marriage to his son. However, Mr Güzel's sister also informed him that she wanted his daughter to marry her son, who wanted to go abroad. Thus the Güzel family was in an awkward position. They returned to the Netherlands without having made a decision.

Both parties regularly phoned to plead their case. Mrs Güzel's brother persisted in reminding her that she had given her word. Mr Güzel's sister objected that it was not the mother, but the father who ought to decide. This situation continued for three years. All that time, the Güzel family avoided seeing the relatives by not going to Turkey. Finally Mr Güzel made up his mind. His second daughter was to marry his sister's son. His third daughter, who was only thirteen, would in time marry the younger son of his brother-in-law. Mr Güzel felt he had no other choice. He also realized that this decision might result in new problems in the future. His third daughter has been living in the Netherlands since she was eight. It remains to be seen whether she will obey her parents and marry her cousin. She has already told her mother that she thinks he is 'a stupid peasant'.

Pressure exerted by the kin group in Turkey

In Turkey, emigration pressures have remained high.⁷ International migration is viewed as the surest way to a higher standard of living, particularly in families and villages that have already sent many migrants abroad. Previous migrants are expected to act as bridgeheads for kinsmen or fellow villagers wishing to migrate as well. During my stay in Turkey, I could get an idea of the pressures exerted on migrants in Western Europe to obtain their assist-

ance. One day, for example, a migrant on holiday in his native village was summoned by his eldest living relative, his grandfather's sister. She asked him about his life in the Netherlands. She remarked that he had been very lucky indeed, and then switched the conversation to the bad luck of one of her grandsons (a second cousin of the migrant). The young man had been deported from Germany after having been there for a year illegally. In conclusion, the old woman begged the migrant: 'Please rescue your cousin, take him with you to Holland and see to it that he gets a job there.' When the migrant told her it would not be possible, she started to cry, and he was so embarrassed he felt obliged to promise to 'arrange something' for his unfortunate cousin.

The network of kin in Turkey often exerts pressure on migrants, not only to persuade them to help intending migrants, but also to get financial support from them. Relatives who have remained in Turkey often have an exaggerated idea of a migrant's financial situation. Even close relatives sometimes cannot conceal their envy. Kinsmen often join forces to exert pressure on a migrant, as in the above example, where a young man had his grandmother approach his second cousin. Thus they make it more difficult for the migrant not to meet with their request, for a refusal would be taken as evidence that he or she no longer values being a member of the kin group at home. Most migrants do not want to give that impression, but they are also unable or unwilling to meet with every request. Some try to avoid difficulties by reducing their contact with their relatives back home to a minimum. By doing so, however, they reinforce the impression that they do not want to keep their place in their kin group in Turkey.

Migrants are most susceptible to pressure exerted by relatives back home if they are in one way or another indebted to them. In many instances, the migrant's family financed his own migration, not only paying the travel expenses but also bearing the costs of his marriage, which gained him admission to the Netherlands. A migrant who is thus indebted to his family often feels obliged to arrange and finance the migration of a younger brother. Hikmet and his brothers are a case in point.

Effects on the marriage market

Restrictions on immigration combined with emigration pressures in Turkey have had a marked effect on the marriage market. Marrying a migrant's daughter is by far the most attractive way to gain admittance to the Netherlands, or in fact any Western European country. Applying for asylum is not an attractive way: the chance of an asylum request being granted is small, and asylum-seekers cannot count on the Turkish authorities giving them a kind reception on their return. The people who want to emigrate are mainly

young men. Migrants who acted as match-makers told me that marriageable Turkish girls living in the Netherlands are consequently extremely sought after. Actually, it is surprising that so many Turkish men want to marry a migrant's daughter and take up residence with her in Western Europe, for in Turkey it is traditionally the wife who takes up residence with her husband and his family. The Turkish word for bride or daughter-in-law, *gelin*, literally means 'she who comes'. The reverse situation very seldom occurs. A man who lives with his in-laws – an *içgüvey*, i.e. an 'inside' bridegroom or son-in-law – is looked upon as rather pathetic.

By no means all intended migrants are successful on the marriage market. In Turkey, it is not uncommon for parents to give their children in marriage to close kin. Especially in rural areas, marriages between first cousins are a frequent phenomenon. Table 1 makes it clear that many first-generation migrants still adhere to this practice. Half the brides and bridegrooms of the second generation in the research population came from the kin group in Turkey.

Table 1: Marriages/engagements of young men and women in the research population between 1986 and 1990^a

marriages/engagements to relatives in Turkey	13	
men		5
women		8
marriages to non-kin in Turkey	6	
men		3
women		3
marriages to Turkish migrants legally residing in the Netherlands	4	
men (two of them 'tourists' themselves) ^b		3
woman (a 'tourist' herself) ^b		1
marriages to Turkish 'tourists'	2	
women		2
marriages to Dutch partners	1	
man		1
total number of marriages/engagements	26	
men		12
women		14

a) With one exception, all the couples took up residence in the Netherlands.

b) The young men and women who had entered the Netherlands as tourists were living with an elder brother or sister in this country.

First-generation parents are often reluctant to give their children in marriage to non-kin, because they expect a relative to be more loyal and reliable than

an unrelated son-in-law or daughter-in-law. In addition, their relatives in Turkey expect the migrants to look within the circle of kin first. There are often prospective migrants among the young kinsmen at home, who set great store by a marriage with a cousin in the Netherlands. In several instances, I observed that migrants who preferred to defer their daughters' betrothals until the girls reached a marriageable age were hard pressed by relatives in Turkey to make a commitment years in advance. Due to the precedence of kinsmen, young men who do not have relatives in the Netherlands stand a poor chance on the marriage market. If they succeed in finding a girl at all, they have to be prepared to pay a high price. As a rule, migrants who give their daughter in marriage to non-kin demand a higher bride-price or extra costly bridal gifts. Amounts in the order of 20,000 guilders are not uncommon.

Migrants with marriageable daughters are in an awkward position if several relatives ask for their daughter's hand. In the research population, there were several cases in point. Such situations do not only happen to migrants. However, in the case of an intended marriage to a migrant's daughter, it is not only the marriage that is at stake, but the prospect of gaining admittance to the Netherlands. That is why matters are more apt to be pushed to extremes. In the case of the Güzel family, the choice was between the mother's brother's son and the father's sister's son. As noted above, marriages between first cousins are not uncommon in Turkey. However, there is not one category of cousins that has preference over the others.⁸ So Mr and Mrs Güzel could not fall back on any rule or tradition.

Mr Güzel found a way out, but it will probably lead to another conflict. It is questionable whether the youngest daughter will accept her father's decision. Other studies have demonstrated that Turkish girls who have grown up in the Netherlands sometimes object to their parents' choosing a husband for them. An increasing number of Turkish girls even run away from home (Brouwer et al. 1992). In the research population, I did not observe any example of this, although one girl did tell her parents she would run away from home if they arranged her marriage without her consent. Her parents took this statement quite seriously. Only recently, their neighbour's daughter had run away because her father wanted to give her in marriage to the son of a friend of his in Turkey. The girl had returned home after the mediation of the Turkish Consulate. Her parents had given their word that they would neither marry her off nor send her back to Turkey. The Consulate had promised to help the girl if her parents broke their word.

Parents still played a prominent part in the marriages contracted in the research population. However, younger parents said they did not believe their children still wanted to have them arrange their marriages. Moreover, parents of younger children anticipated that their children would look for a spouse in

the Netherlands rather than having a bride or bridegroom come over from Turkey.

‘Tourists’

Aware that they stand a poor chance of succeeding, most migrants are not keen to act as match-makers for relatives in Turkey. Rather than bluntly refusing, however, they often promise to do their best. During my stay in Turkey, quite a few young men told me they were looking forward to a letter from a relative abroad who had promised to find them a bride in Western Europe. Some of them waited with resignation. Others preferred to go and try their luck on the marriage market themselves, just as earlier migrants went to look for work in Western Europe. Due to the visa requirement, however, nowadays it is much harder to enter the Netherlands, or indeed any Western European country, as a tourist. A visa is hard to get. The applicant has to convince the Dutch authorities he will not become a public charge in the Netherlands. He either has to have sufficient financial means himself, which is not the case with most prospective migrants, or have a guarantor of financial support in the Netherlands. Travelling without a visa is risky and complicated. In fact it is an option that is only open to prospective migrants who are able to pay a large sum of money to a clandestine ‘travel agency’ or who have relatives in the Netherlands who are willing to smuggle them in hidden in their car or on the documents of a settled immigrant.

The large majority of the households studied had on occasion been called upon to help a prospective migrant get a visa or help him come over without a visa. In most instances they refused to comply, anticipating that they might have to provide board and lodging throughout a lengthy illegal stay. They often referred to the Dutch restrictions to make their refusal acceptable. I once overheard a migrant explaining to prospective migrants in Turkey that he was not entitled to invite relatives or friends because he was out of work. In order to obtain a visa for a family visit, one does indeed need someone with sufficient income to vouch for the living and travelling expenses. However, instead of the relative, someone else can also act as guarantor. The migrant involved was probably acquainted with this possibility, but preferred not to mention it.

In the case of Hikmet and his brothers, Hikmet’s wife objected most to having yet another brother of his come over. This situation is not uncommon. The people who feel most obliged to their relatives in Turkey are often recent immigrants. Their spouses, who have lived longer in the Netherlands and whose next of kin also live in this country, often object to being called upon by their in-laws. One woman even threatened she would call the Foreign

Police if her husband brought his youngest brother to the Netherlands. The husband was about to do so, but thought better of it.

Nine of the 28 households studied did have prospective migrants come over as 'tourists', although they were aware of the risk of a prolonged illegal stay. All in all, fourteen 'tourists' were accommodated, thirteen men and one young woman. The large majority (12 out of 14) entered the Netherlands on a visa for a short stay. Two 'tourists' were smuggled over the border to France shortly after their arrival. In France, they had other kinsmen who had already found jobs for them and would help them apply for asylum. The asylum procedure in France seemed to be an accepted temporary labour migration route in their village of origin, largely inhabited by Kurds. Contrary to the Dutch asylum procedure, the French procedure offered immediate access to the labour market.⁹

The other twelve 'tourists' remained after their visa expired and stayed for various lengths of time illegally in the Netherlands. Among them were seven single persons, six young men and the young woman, who hoped to have their stay legalized by a marriage. Two other men were already married to Turkish women living in the Netherlands, but their wives did not yet qualify for family reunification (cf. the case of the Güzel family). One man was already married in Turkey. He first filed an asylum request. After a two-year wait, the decision was negative. Meanwhile, his wife in Turkey had started divorce proceedings. He then put his hopes on a legal or common law marriage with a Dutch woman as a way of legalizing his status. Two other men were also already married in Turkey. Unlike the remaining 'tourists', they did not intend to settle in the Netherlands. They only wanted to do seasonal agricultural work.

All these 'tourists' were relatives, mostly younger brothers, of the people they lived with. Due to the changed economic conditions and the restrictions on immigration in the Netherlands, Turkish migrants appear to be no longer prepared to grant hospitality to distant relatives. More than in the past, chain migration is confined to next of kin. I heard of only one case of a migrant lodging a 'tourist' who was a distant relative he had never met before. The 'tourist' was not without means, though, and the migrant had persuaded him to hand over all his money right after his arrival. So for the migrant, it was not a bad bargain.

None of the 'tourists' in the research population considered a lengthy illegal stay an attractive option. For most of them, tourist migration was only a way to enter the country and examine the legal possibilities. In most cases, the illegal stay lasted less than a year. (Over the two years of the field study, the 'tourists' accounted for an average of five per cent of the total research population.) In nine out of the twelve cases, the illegal stay was terminated before the end of my field work. Four 'tourists' had their status legalized,

three of them because they had found a bride, and the fourth, who was married already, because his wife could meet the requirements for family reunification. One 'tourist' was deported by the Foreign Police. Four other 'tourists' returned to Turkey of their own accord. One of the reasons why the duration of the illegal stay was limited was that the 'tourists' put their host families to expense. Most 'tourists' had little or no income. They sometimes had irregular jobs for a few weeks. In the event that their relatives had their own business, they sometimes worked there. Apart from that, it was hard to find a job. Many host families had been out of work themselves for a long time.¹⁰

In some cases, the migrant household was internally divided about offering board and lodgings to the 'tourist'. Wives were inclined to object to relatives of their husband living with them for a long time, and husbands were opposed to accommodating relatives of their wife. It was not always the costs that bothered them most. Sometimes they were more concerned that the Dutch authorities would find out. They were especially afraid of other Turks informing on them. By no means all Turkish migrants sympathize with compatriots staying in the Netherlands without permits. Migrants with daughters of marriageable age are often afraid that their daughters will be abducted or elope with 'tourists' who hope to get their status legalized via a marriage. During the field study, I observed two cases of migrants' daughters being abducted by 'tourists'. As in the case of Hikmet, the 'tourists' had first proposed and were rejected by the girl's parents. It appeared, however, that the girls had not been abducted against their will. They seemed to have eloped with their abductors of their own accord. I heard of several other abductions by Turkish 'tourists'. Every abduction caused great anxiety among the parents of marriageable daughters. Some parents confided to me that they would like to report all the 'tourists' they knew to the Foreign Police. Migrants who did not have to fear for their daughters sometimes also expressed their aversion to 'tourists'. Migrants who had been among the earliest arrivals or had come to the Netherlands through official recruitment were sometimes afraid the 'tourists' would give all Turkish migrants a bad name. Many of these earlier and officially recruited migrants had urban origins and were skilled workers, which was another reason they sometimes looked down upon the illegal newcomers, who mainly came from rural areas.

In more than half the cases, the 'tourists' and their host families did not manage to find a marriage partner within their Turkish network in the Netherlands. After a period of time, some of them started to look for a partner for an *anlasma evliligi* or *parayla evliligi* (a 'contractual' marriage or a marriage for money), i.e. a marriage existing only on paper, which would be dissolved as soon as the 'tourist' qualified for an independent residence permit. A Turkish migrant's daughter would be impossible to find for such a marriage. I was asked several times to act as a match-maker, even by

families who did not know me personally. Apparently, the migrants had very few Dutch friends they could turn to. Not surprisingly, none of the 'tourists' succeeded in finding a Dutch bride.

Conclusions

The findings presented above reveal why the restrictive Dutch admittance policy has not prevented further immigration of Turks to the Netherlands. Family reunification is practically the only option left open for Turks wishing to live in the Netherlands. As an unintended result, prospective migrants have come to depend to an ever-increasing extent on chain migration. Emigration pressures in Turkey are converted into pressures on settled immigrants to help intending migrants. As many settled immigrants, especially from the rural areas, have remained under an obligation to support their extended family back home, these pressures are effective and result in intense utilization of the Dutch provisions for family reunification.

It might be interesting to compare my findings to those of other researchers, for example Garrison and Weiss (1979) on the migration of extended families from the Dominican Republic to the United States. Garrison and Weiss observed that Dominican families utilize illegal as well as legal mechanisms to reunite in the United States. I also found that intending migrants in Turkey are prepared to violate admittance regulations if necessary. Yet by far the majority of the 'tourists' in the research population entered the Netherlands legally, i.e. on a visa for a family visit. Moreover, most of them did not overstay their visa for long. Entering the country illegally can be extremely expensive, and there is no guarantee of legalization. Add to this that 'tourists' are excluded from the regular labour market and social security system, and that other jobs are scarce. Under these circumstances, staying illegally in the country is no longer attractive.

My findings also reveal that settled immigrants are not always willing to act as bridgeheads for prospective migrants. They sometimes act more like gatekeepers for the Dutch authorities. The same circumstances that have made an illegal stay less attractive, have also made it less attractive for settled immigrants to have relatives come over. Many settled immigrants have a feeling, anyway, that their network of kin in Turkey is making unfair demands on them. Moreover, by no means all Turkish immigrants sympathize with illegal newcomers, so that immigrants who have their relatives come over as 'tourists' might be reported to the Dutch authorities by their countrymen. Contrary to my expectations, the settled immigrants in the research population thus exhibited very little inclination to circumvent Dutch regulations to have relatives join them. If they were prepared to utilize illegal mechanisms at all, they were only inclined to do so for close relatives. Thus, the Dutch

admittance regulations are far from ineffectual: legal mechanisms are clearly preferred to illegal ones. Combined with the above circumstances, immigration restrictions have also tended to increase the selectivity of Turkish chain migration to the Netherlands.

To conclude, my findings show that the more settled migrants become in the receiving society, the less inclined they are to invest in links with their communities of origin. Consequently, they are also less inclined to have kinsmen come over. It can therefore be assumed that the mechanism of chain migration will gradually weaken. In the research population, apart from the emigration pressures in Turkey, the mechanism was maintained by the inclination of first-generation migrants to give their children in marriage to intending migrants in Turkey. It is to be expected, however, that the second and third generation, born and bred in the Netherlands, will choose their brides and bridegrooms themselves and will increasingly do so in the Netherlands rather than in their parents' community of origin.

This may seem a rather obvious conclusion, but in fact, the question of why and when migration chains weaken or disappear has barely been systematically addressed in the literature on chain migration. Most studies have focussed on the operation and persistence of migration chains (cf. Boyd 1989, 655). In order to gain greater understanding of the dynamics of the phenomenon, however, the conditions under which migration chains fail to operate or tend to weaken and disappear need to be studied as well.

NOTES

1. I use the term chain migration in a wider sense than authors who confine it to the process whereby a particular village or town sends many of its inhabitants abroad to build up counterparts of itself. See Price (1963, 107 ff.) for a review of the ways the term has been used since the end of the nineteenth century.
2. This study was funded by a grant from the Legal Research Foundation, which is part of the Netherlands Foundation for Scientific Research.
3. I use the term 'tourist' in the same way as Turkish migrants use it. Turkish workers sent abroad by the TES obtain a 'worker's passport', which is less expensive and is valid longer than an ordinary 'tourist passport'. Tourists used to be labour migrants who arrived in Western Europe without the intervention of the TES, using a tourist passport. If they found a job, they could subsequently acquire a work and residence permit and a worker's passport. Nowadays the term tourist has more of a connotation of being 'illegal'.
4. This percentage is higher than it may seem. Stirling (1965, 40) calculated that at any time, at least half the households in a village are composed of conjugal families. This is in part the consequence of mergers occurring on the death of a patriarch, resulting in the creation of conjugal family households, and in part of the length of time it takes for a conjugal family to reach the stage where its sons get married and its grandchildren are born.
5. Such stories are also related in Turkish migrant literature. For instance, in *The Bird that Flew to the West*, Sadik Yemni wrote about a Turkish migrant acting as interpreter and intermediary for illegal workers: 'Atilla was hardly a reliable person. He simply reported

the illegal workers he had helped to a job to the police and then he recruited new people, who again yielded him 500 guilders each' (Yemni 1987, 175).

6. All the names in this article are pseudonyms.
7. In 1990, there were 7 million men in the 20-35 age group in Turkey. Martin (1991, 94) estimated that a third of these young men would emigrate if they could. The number of recruitments was much smaller. According to the Turkish State Planning Organization, almost 50,000 migrant workers were sent abroad through official channels in 1989. The vast majority were recruited by Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Iraq (Devlet Planlama Teskilâtı 1990, 351-352). In comparison: between 1961 and 1974 the TES records showed a yearly average of almost 60,000 workers sent abroad, and between 1975 and 1988 an annual average of almost 35,000 (cf. Muus and Penninx 1991, 37). During the peak years 1969-1973, nearly 555,000 workers were sent abroad, about 17 per cent of the 20-35 age group at the time (Martin 1991, 94).
8. Cf. Stirling (1965, 201) and Delaney (1991, 106-111) on marriage practices in villages in Central Anatolia. Stirling observed that quite a few children were given in marriage to relatives on their mother's side, although some villagers stated a preference for their father's brother's child. According to Delaney, parents often prefer to give their daughter to the son of a female relative on either side, because it is this woman with whom their daughter will work and spend most of her time.
9. In 1991 the French asylum regulations were changed, so that asylum-seekers no longer have access to the labour market.
10. 'Tourists' probably still have better chances in a city like Amsterdam with more regular and irregular employment opportunities. One of the 'tourists' from the research population eventually left for that city: he had an uncle there who could help him get a job in the clothing workshop of another Turk. The clothing industry is also one of the branches where most illegal workers are found (DIA 1992).

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